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The theme of 'emerging models of worker participation and representation' is uniquely 
appropriate in relation to South Africa today. In February 1995 a draft labour statute, 
designed to replace the existing Labour Relations Act 1   and corresponding statutes 
applicable to the public, education and agricultural sectors, was published 2   One of its 
more radical innovations is the proposal for a system of worker participation by means of 
elected bodies to be known as 'workplace forums'. 
The draft law has turned out to be controversial, and at the time of writing it is not clear 
what its fate will eventually be. Inter alia, the chapter on workplace forums has reportedly 
encountered opposition from trade unions as well as employers. Debate of this nature, 
however, is integral to the emergence of new industrial relations models. This article will 
attempt to evaluate the proposed system of worker participation and to explore some of its 
implications which may be of interest internationally. In particular, it will focus on the 
envisaged relationship between workplace forums and trade unions - a question that will be 
crucial to the success or failure of the project. 
 
 
2 a Brief Background 
The proposed law should be viewed in its historical setting. For reasons that are generally 
known, independent trade unions in South Africa have evolved in a strongly adversarial 
relationship vis-à-vis employers and the state. The union movement - in particular, that 
part of it affiliated to the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) - played a 
major role in forcing the retreat by the previous regime which led to the election 
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of a 'government of national unity', led by the African National Congress (ANC), in April 
1994. 3 
Since then the circumstances of these unions have changed dramatically. The ANC, indeed, 
had fought the election in a formal alliance with COSATU and the South African Communist 
Party (SACP). A significant number of union leaders have been drawn into government and 
public administration at national, provincial and local levels. 
With hindsight, a more fundamental rapprochement between unions, the state and 
employers may have been set in motion a decade earlier when, following the legal 
recognition of African workers as 'employees', 4   independent unions started joining 
industrial councils 5   during the early 1980's. A controversial tactic at the time, it was 
criticized as well as defended - by some, as compromising the unions' ability to promote 
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labour interests unambiguously; by others, as a necessary move in the struggle for better 
wages and conditions. 6   Though subsequent events provided ammunition for both schools 
of thought, the tactic itself became established and industrial councils are now accepted as 
a legitimate, if bureaucratic, mechanism of collective bargaining. 
Over the same period, trade unions and union federations were also being drawn into 
bipartite, tripartite and multipartite structures or ad hoc configurations with employers, 
government and other parties for a variety of purposes. This trend reached its zenith (to 
date) with the creation of the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC) 
early in 1995. 7   In the process the term 'corporatism' 8   came to be used as shorthand 
for describing the involvement of labour with employers and/or 
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the state in consultative structures at workplace and/or centralized level. 9   It is used in 
the same sense here. 
In the early stages, much attention was focused on employer driven efforts at creating 
participatory structures at enterprise level in line with contemporary management theory. 10   
During the last year or two, however, the debate has taken a new turn. From being a 
management initiative with essentially commercial objectives, the participatory project has 
become redefined as a dimension of public policy. Briefly, the proposition is that South 
Africa's priorities have shifted from the struggle for democratic rights to the struggle for 
economic and social upliftment of the black majority. For this to succeed, it will be 
necessary to cure the chronic malfunctioning that increasingly affected the country's 
economic performance since the mid-1970's. 11   A corresponding shift from adversarial 
towards more participative industrial relations is deemed imperative, not only for the 
reasons that apply in every country competing on the world market but, specifically, as part 
of achieving the developmental aims of the government's Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP). 
From this perspective it is not only in labour's interests to cooperate with management over 
production related issues with a view to boosting the prospects of job security and higher 
wages; it is part of labour's responsibility as a key player in the formulation and execution 
of national policy 12 
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Against this background came the proposed new labour statute (referred to from now on as 
the draft bill), intended to give effect to the guarantees of fundamental human rights 
contained in the new Constitution 13   as well as the vision of improved economic 
performance based on improved industrial relations. It also concretized much of the debate 
that has gone before, raising issues which are significant not only in a local context but 
more broadly. In a world increasingly characterized by social, economic and national 
tensions, the new South Africa has emerged as a laboratory of conflict resolution. If the new 
labour dispensation can mould relative stability and enhanced economic performance out of 
the endemic industrial warfare of the past, it will surely be of interest internationally. 
Conversely, South Africa has a great deal to learn from the experience of other countries, in 
particular those countries where systems of worker participation have been operating for 
decades. A comparative approach is therefore essential. 
 




3 the Rationale for Workplace Forums 
The draft bill presents workplace forums as part of the industrial restructuring which is 
necessary for South Africa to compete on international markets as well as a mechanism of 
economic development. 14   'Workplace restructuring', it is argued, 'has been most 
successful in those countries where participatory structures exist' (such as Germany and 
Sweden); countries (such as Britain) that are characterized by an adversarial system of 
industrial relations are said to have 'fared badly'. 15   Workplace forums are accordingly 
expected to 'facilitate a shift, at the workplace, from adversarial collective bargaining on all 
matters to joint problem-solving and participation on certain subjects'. Unless workers and 
management 'work together more effectively', it is argued, 'they will fail adequately to 
improve productivity and living standards'. 
At the same time the drafters were sensitive to union fears that workplace forums might cut 
across the struggle to develop enterprise level bargaining, and went to considerable lengths 
(as 
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will be discussed below) to defuse them. The aim, according to the Explanatory 
Memorandum, is 'not to undermine collective bargaining' but 'to perform functions that 
collective bargaining cannot easily achieve: the joint solution of problems and the resolution 
of conflicts over production'. It is assumed that production related or 'non-wage matters' 
are capable of being dealt with in a non-adversarial manner at workplace level whereas 
'wage matters' are the proper subject of industry level collective bargaining. 
 
 
4 'Cooperation' Versus 'Adversarialism' 
Are these assumptions realistic? The Explanatory Memorandum, in effect, treats adversarial 
industrial relations as a central obstacle to economic progress 16   - an approach 
uncomfortably suggestive of the view that strikes are the main cause of economic problems. 
'Dialogue', in contrast, emerges as an autonomous and seemingly decisive factor in the 
quest for competitiveness. Such a view is certainly not prevalent among authorities on the 
systems of worker participation in countries such as Germany which helped to inspire the 
draft bill. Rather, plant level industrial relations is understood as only one of a range of 
factors which, in combination, determine economic performance. Investment levels, for 
example, have historically been far higher in the 'successful' countries mentioned in the 
memorandum than in 'unsuccessful' Britain. 
Nor does it follow that production related topics of consultation are necessarily less 
controversial or more conducive to agreement than the 'distributive' topics of collective 
bargaining. And there is little evidence that the institutions of worker participation reflect a 
willingness to collaborate on the part of management and labour while collective bargaining 
reflects an attitude of confrontation. As Blanpain comments: 
 'I would certainly not accept this connotation as being an important one. It seems to me that the attitude of the 
actors, namely whether they want to work together or to fight, is more important than the structures through 
which they operate.' 17 
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In South Africa, the 'attitude of the actors' has been crucially influenced by the traumatic 
historical experiences through which present labour relations have been shaped. Decades of 
deprivation, conflict and mistrust on the part of black workers will not disappear overnight. 
Organized labour cannot but reflect the accumulated aspirations of a severely deprived 
working population. The institution of workplace forums will need to be 
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experienced as a means towards realizing at least some of these aspirations, or it is unlikely 
to gain credibility. 
A better approach is to start with the actual causes of South Africa's poor economic 
performance in all their complexity, and the actual causes of industrial conflict, in order to 
assess the role that a participative form of management could realistically be expected to 
play. A system of 'cooperation' imposed from above might be perceived as a device for 
disarming the union movement, not necessarily by creating an organizational alternative in 
the shape of workplace forums (which the draft bill denies) but, more insidiously, by 
downplaying the importance of independent ('adversarial') mobilization in the eyes of 
workers. If the view takes root on the union side that worker participation is really about 
limiting their power while managerial power remains essentially intact, 18   the 
participatory project is likely to be still-born. 
 
 
5 Curbing the Right to Strike 
The draft bill goes on to give some substance to such fears. The most obvious way in which 
it would limit conflict has little to do with a spirit of cooperation and is hardly mentioned in 
the Explanatory Memorandum: it would prohibit industrial action over 'rights' issues as 
opposed to 'interest' issues. 19   Included among the former would be - 
(a) all topics designated as topics for joint decision making in terms of clause 66, and 
(b) attempts by employers unilaterally to implement decisions in respect of topics 
designated as topics for consultation in terms of clause 63 - in other words, without 
following the procedure laid down by clause 65. 
While this is in line with international trends, it marks a substantial departure from the 
existing position that disputes may be declared and industrial action taken over any issue, 
including issues of 'right'. Inevitably, it would have an impact on the bargaining agenda and, 
more particularly, on union efforts to extend the bargaining agenda. Unless it is backed by 
the ability to strike, it has been said, collective bargaining becomes collective begging. By 
seeking to limit the scope for industrial conflict in this way, the draft bill may intensify 
suspicions among trade unionists that their hard-won ability to defend their members' 
interests by 
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means of collective bargaining is under threat. 20   In practice, the bargaining agenda 
would be limited by legislative intervention - something which has thus far gone against the 
grain of our pluralist tradition. 
The draft bill furthermore does away with the concept of 'unfair labour practice' which has 
thus far enabled the Industrial Court to order recalcitrant employers to bargain with 
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representative unions at plant level. Legally, this is problematical. The interim Constitution 
guarantees all employees a right to 'adversarial' collective bargaining as well as a right to 
strike. Even accepting that this does not place a duty on private sector employers to bargain 
(a point which has yet to be clarified), it does call into question the competence of the 
legislature to curtail existing bargaining rights unless it can be established that such 
curtailment meets the criteria for limitation of fundamental rights set out in s 33 of the 
interim Constitution. 
Also from an industrial relations point of view there are strong arguments for leaving the 
present (unlimited) bargaining agenda and the right to strike as they are. Trade union 
hackles are likely to be raised, especially at grass roots level, by interference with their 
hard-won rights. If workplace forums come to be perceived as a sweetener for this pill, they 
will fail. The 'bargained corporatism' envisaged by the draft bill cannot be imposed by 
closing off the road of collective bargaining and illegalizing the right to strike over what has 
been termed 'quality of work' issues. Unions will be antagonized, and the causes of conflict 
will remain. Workplace forums will only succeed if they become a preferred option - ie if 
workers and unions with a free choice in the matter come to see them as bodies through 
which such issues can be dealt with more satisfactorily than by means of collective 
bargaining. 21 
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6 the Democratizing Aspect of Worker Participation 
All this suggests that a narrow economic motivation for worker participation aimed primarily 
at curbing industrial action, though possibly reassuring to management, carries the risk of 
alienating labour. It goes without saying that the economic rationale for the reorganization 
of work along more cooperative lines is vitally important. Equally clearly, however, issues of 
power are involved which may well be decisive from the labour point of view. Since the aim 
is to arrive at a model that will be considered serviceable by labour as well as management, 
it is necessary to start from a more balanced understanding of the functions that workplace 
forums will have to serve. 
Internationally it is recognized that, alongside of its economic role, worker participation also 
has 'moral' (or 'ethical') and 'sociopolitical' objectives. 22   A Dutch textbook, for example, 
refers to the 'requirement of basic fairness, that they who are affected by particular 
decisions . .  should be involved in discussing and taking such decisions'. It continues: 
 'We can call this consideration one of democracy . . . . It applies in various cohabitational contexts such as the 
state, an association or a family, and equally in a cooperative context such as an enterprise.' 23 
From this standpoint, maximum involvement in decision making at work is a basic human 
right, not confined to trade union members, for which appropriate institutions need to be 
created. In South Africa, given its history of political repression and the aim of 
empowerment reflected in the RDP, such considerations should weigh heavily. 
The point also has legal significance. When interpreting statute law, courts must give effect 
to the intention of the legislature as expressed by the wording of the statute. While the 
Minister of Labour has described worker participation as 'more than a moral or ethical 
imperative', situated within 'parameters of equity and social justice', 24   the draft bill itself 
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does not reflect this. The only imperative identified with the functions of workplace forums 
is that of 'seeking to enhance efficiency in the workplace'. 25   Such an explicit directive will 
be binding on a court in a way that a general statement of intent by a minister is not. The 
implication is that economic efficiency must take precedence over the requirements 
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of democracy and that, if 'efficiency' (as understood by the court) demands it, workers' 
rights to be involved in decision making must be curtailed. 
Yet the notion of a mutually exclusive relationship between efficiency and democracy is by 
no means obvious. An alternative approach, starting from a recognition of the contrasting 
functions of worker participation, would be to seek a synthesis: a system of workplace 
governance designed to enhance democracy as well as efficiency, in mutually reinforcing 
ways, to the greatest possible extent. The relevant provisions of the draft bill will be looked 
at in this light. 
 
 
7 the Powers of Workplace Forums 
The constitution of a workplace forum may be determined by means of a plant level 
collective agreement; failing this, the provisions of the draft bill, as set out below, will apply. 
It is therefore likely that a majority of workplace forums could have customized powers, 
capacities and modes of operation having little in common with those proposed by the draft 
bill. In practice, since only unions can trigger the establishment of workplace forums 26   
such negotiated powers would presumably be more extensive or more favourable to the 
union than those contained in the draft bill, or the union would have no incentive to agree to 
them. Only if the parties are unable to agree would the draft bill come into play. What 
follows should therefore be read with this proviso in mind. 
Clause 63 of the draft bill provides that a workplace forum is 'entitled to be consulted' by an 
employer about proposals on a range of issues to be determined by NEDLAC. Clause 66 
provides for what is termed 'joint decision making', by which is meant that an employer 
may not implement proposals on a different range of topics, also to be determined by 
NEDLAC, until it has reached consensus with the workplace forum. International precedent 
suggests that the topics intended by clause 63 will be production related issues (such as 
restructuring of work, product development plans, investment decisions, mergers, etc) and 
those intended by clause 66 will be what might be termed 'social' issues (pension funds, 
medical aid schemes, etc). 27   Clause 67 further entitles a workplace forum to relevant 
information for purposes of consultation and joint decision making. 
If the employer fails to consult as required by clause 63, the workplace forum may seek 
mediation and, if this fails, arbitration 
through the mechanisms proposed by the draft bill. 28   In such an event, the arbitrator 
could presumably order the employer to repeat any part of the consultation exercise that 
may have been flawed before taking a final decision. If there is no agreement on a subject 
of joint decision making, on the other hand, the dispute may be referred to arbitration from 
which there is no appeal. As already noted, these remedies displace workers' constitutional 
right to take industrial action. 29 





8 the Content of the Duty to Consult 
Contrary to what is sometimes assumed, only the process of joint decision making provided 
for by clause 66 would promote democratization directly. Democracy implies an open-ended 
mechanism for articulating conflicting viewpoints and deciding along lines of majoritarianism 
which one will prevail: 'open-ended' in the sense that the process itself will determine which 
viewpoint commands a majority. In the consultative scheme of things it is settled in 
advance whose viewpoint will finally prevail. 'Consultation', as contemplated by clause 63, 
would not limit managerial prerogative but merely impose certain procedural duties on 
management in exercising its prerogative. 
It is true that consultation - and, in particular, the duty to provide workplace forums with 
relevant information - could have an important educative function and increase workers' 
ability to take decisions. It may also influence the decision-making process. Clause 65 gives 
workplace forums and workers an opportunity of seeking to win the employer over to their 
point of view. But, if they fail to do so, the employer may implement its proposal 
unilaterally. 30   Workers must then either submit or take industrial action in terms of 
clause 47. 
The draft bill further confines the role of the workplace forum to one of responding to 
management proposals. It is not clear why 
1995 ILJ p795 
it does this. In the Netherlands, for example, works councils have a 'right of initiative' to 
make proposals on any subject for consideration by the employer. 31 
Finally, the draft bill creates the possibility of amending the agendas contained in clauses 63 
and 66 by means of collective agreement (although, in the case of additional matters for 
consultation, limiting the parties' discretion by confining it to the topics specified by clause 
63(3)). The object of doing so, however, is left unclear. This highlights an important 
omission from the draft bill. Avowedly concerned with improved economic performance, it 
implicitly recognizes workers' ability to contribute to the governance of the workplace. Yet it 
gives no sign of regarding worker participation as a dynamic process driven by workers' 
increasing capacity and preparedness to take part in decision making. Adjustment by means 
of collective bargaining is a useful mechanism but, in practice, unlikely to focus adequately 
on production related issues. Indeed, part of the rationale for workplace forums is precisely 
the supposition that efficient regulation of such issues is something 'that collective 
bargaining cannot easily achieve'. 32 
Nothing, of course, would prevent parliament from amending clauses 63 and 66 from time 
to time. But provision for amendment to the agendas for consultation and joint decision 
making in the light of the increasing experience gained by workplace forums and the 
requirements of national policy, on the advice of NEDLAC, would have been a more 
proactive way of dealing with this need. 
To sum up: though the draft bill reserves a decision on the specific powers of workplace 
forums for NEDLAC, it qualifies them in advance. The intention, presumably, is to 
accommodate management fears of interference with their freedom to manage. The 
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question that arises is whether, on this basis, the draft bill can satisfy labour's expectation 
of becoming a serious stakeholder in the drive for economic development. 
 
 
9 Acquiring Expert Skills 
A further concern among trade unionists is that workplace forums (like shop stewards in 
collective bargaining) may be disadvantaged by the preponderance of expert skills, advice 
and knowledge which employers tend to have at their disposal. The draft bill addresses this 
problem in two ways. 
Firstly, clause 71 allows members of workplace forums to take reasonable time off work for 
undergoing training at the expense of the employer. Clause 73 moreover requires 
employers to provide 
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workplace forums with facilities that are 'reasonable having regard to the size and 
capabilities of the employer'. 
Secondly, clause 70 provides that workplace forums 'may have recourse to experts' with a 
right to attend their meetings with employers and have access to information. However, no 
clear provision is made for enabling workplace forums to exercise this right. They will have 
no independent resources to pay for the services of experts. 33   In practice, workplace 
forums (like their counterparts in Europe) may well have to turn to trade unions for advice, 
training and support. This may help to cement the relationship between unions and 
workplace forums but could make heavy demands on unions' already limited resources. 
More proactive efforts by the state seem necessary to make the policy work. There should 
at least be a clear commitment to the principle that workplace forums and their members 
must receive the necessary training and consultative support to play the role that public 
policy envisages for them. This could include provision for training of workplace forums by 
bargaining councils and for training boards to be given this function in terms of the 
Manpower Training Act. 34   In particular, unions should be involved in this, possibly by 
receiving direct assistance in setting up accredited training schemes for workplace forums. 
This would tend to give more credibility to such training as well as serving the ends of 
workers' empowerment. In any event, the principle should be clear: if participation in 
management is to be considered to be part of the inherent functions of employees, then the 
existing concept of skills training should be broadened to accommodate this. 
 
 
10 Establishing a Workplace Forum 
Clause 57 lays down two requirements which might well serve to confine workplace forums 
to an insignificant minority of workplaces. Firstly, it excludes workplace forums from all 
workplaces with fewer than 100 employees - by all accounts, the vast majority of 
workplaces in the country. 35   Secondly, it provides that only trade unions representing a 
majority of employees in the workplace shall have the capacity to trigger the establishment 
of workplace forums. This would further limit the number of 
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workplace forums to (a) workplaces where a majority union is present 36   and (b) where 
such majority union wants to see a workplace forum established. 
Workplace forums as conceived here will have an identity crisis. While supposedly 
representing all workers in the workplace as opposed to union members only, 37   workers 
themselves cannot initiate their establishment. The aim of the exercise thus becomes 
unclear. Workplace forums, according to the Explanatory Memorandum, are necessary to 
serve the developmental purposes of national policy. Yet unions are effectively given a 
power to prevent them from coming into existence in workplaces where they have a 
majority, while workplaces without a majority union are left out altogether. The aim is 
obviously to allay union fears of employer dominated workplace forums that could be used 
to undermine trade unionism and to 'get the unions on board'. But is this the way to do it? 
If a 'second channel' is necessary for the national economy to grow, can it be left to 
individual unions to create or not create in the light of their own perceived interests? 38   
Indeed, can workplace forums succeed if the draft bill itself treats them as potential rivals 
against which unions need the protection of the law? 
Also in another sense the approach adopted in clause 57 is puzzling. South African workers 
are no strangers to dealing with attempts to foist unwanted structures on them. Even in the 
early 1970's, when independent trade unionism was all but extinct, management created 
liaison committees proved to be only the feeblest obstacle to the growth of the new unions. 
However, taking union sensitivities into account, an alternative approach might be to 
provide for the establishment of workplace forums at the instance of majority unions or a 
petition signed by a stipulated 
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number or percentage of employees. This would be consistent with the approach of clause 
58(4), where employees are permitted to nominate candidates for election on this basis. 
The point is that, where a majority of workers in a workplace desire the establishment of a 
workplace forum, a power of veto by the union seeking to represent them seems a 
questionable device for winning union support. 39   A better approach, it is submitted, 
would be to offer unions sound practical reasons for accepting workplace forums. Only if this 
happens could the latter function in the way suggested by the Explanatory Memorandum: as 
a supplement rather than an alternative to collective bargaining. On this basis unions would 
be enabled to move from their present defensive position and begin to think constructively 
about the relationships they could develop with workplace forums. 
International precedent suggests ways in which this could be done. 
 
 
11 Trade Unions and Works Councils 
It is noteworthy that in European countries with statutory systems of works councils 
employers are generally under a duty to establish such councils in the sense that any 
employee, not only unions, can demand their institution. Yet, in practice, unions have little 
difficulty in holding their own against 'competition' from this source. 40 
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A persistent theme in the unions' perception of workplace forums in South Africa has been 
one of 'us' and 'them'. The assumption is that workplace forums would be non-union or 
anti-union bodies, actually or potentially under management control. Leaving aside the 
union trigger mechanism contained in the existing draft bill, as well as the unions' proven 
ability to make unwanted impositions unworkable, 41   European experience suggests that 
such a dichotomy is unlikely to occur in practice. 
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Whatever management might intend, unions - provided, of course, that they do not adopt 
an abstentionist position - are likely to command a majority on most works councils. In the 
Netherlands, some two-thirds of works council members in larger enterprises are trade 
unionists. The trend is even more marked in Germany, where some 86% of works council 
members are trade unionists and some 75% are members of unions affiliated to the 
social-democratic trade union federation, the DGB 42   Union representation on works 
councils is more than twice their representation in the workforce as a whole. In countries 
with a higher union density such as Belgium, on the other hand, unions are said to have 
'colonized the works council'. 43 
This comes about not because unions are given a protected role by law (as some South 
African trade unionists demand in respect of workplace forums) but, more simply, because 
active unionists tend to be natural candidates for election to bodies of this nature. 
The Dutch example, given a relatively low level of unionization compared to other northern 
European countries, is particularly instructive. Union density in the Netherlands has declined 
to approximately 26% of the working population in recent years 44   and there is little 
union presence at workplace level, 'partly through neglect by the trade union movement 
over a long period of time'. 45   In certain sectors, more effort has been made to organize 
members into groups at enterprise level (bedrijfsledengroepen). In the metal and transport 
sectors, in particular, such structures have been formed in two-thirds of enterprises with 
over 100 employees. In the banking and insurance sectors, on the other hand, this is true of 
only one in ten enterprises. 
Against this background, the FNV 46   'admitted [the] primacy of the councils [at enterprise 
level] in 1990 and made union participation in the councils a strategic priority'. 47   Its 
attitude was premised on the coexistence of union structures and works councils in the 
workplace and the understanding that both these mechanisms can serve to promote 
employee interests in different 
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but complementary ways. On the one hand, works councils can serve as a means of 
establishing or 'legitimizing' a union presence at plant level, especially in enterprises where 
it is not yet established. 
Collaboration between unions and works councils, however, is not confined to workplaces 
where unions are weak. More than one interviewee during a recent study visit by the writer 
to the Netherlands and Germany stressed that the operation of the works council system is 
optimal in enterprises with a powerful union presence. 48   An organized union structure 
alongside a works council can, from the union point of view, serve a fourfold function: 
(a) it can play a stimulating role in respect of the works council, which will generally 
contain union members; 
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(b) it can serve as a channel of communication between the union and the works council; 
(c) it can represent workers' individual interests as well as collective interests not 
provided for by statute; and 
(d) it may have a negotiating role at enterprise level in terms of a national collective 
bargaining agreement. 49 
Works councils, from their side, tend to see unions as organizations offering expertise and 
services (for example, counselling and training) which the councils themselves do not 
dispose over. 'Calling in a trade union organizer', Koene & Slomp observe, 'is one of the 
most frequently used power mechanisms of work councils' 50   As in Germany, informal 
arrangements of this nature can be more influential than legal rules in establishing union 
authority in the works council arena. 
This does not take away the possibility of conflict between unions and works councils. In 
Germany, for example, despite union policy to oppose overtime work in the interests of job 
creation, union members on works councils may come under pressure from their 
constituencies to agree to overtime rosters in order to boost earnings. In such cases the 
latter pressures tends to be decisive. 51   More than one interviewee in the Netherlands and 
1995 ILJ p801 
Germany, however, stressed to the writer the crucial role of trade unions in combating 
inward looking tendencies on the part of works councils, sometimes referred to as 
'workplace egoism', by injecting a sense of the broader interests of the labour movement, of 
solidarity with other workers and issues of social importance. 
In practice, collaboration between unions and works councils appears to be the rule. Unions 
are able to represent and defend worker interests in ways not available to works councils - 
for example, through industrial action. 52   Works councils, in turn, enjoy statutory rights 
which unions do not have - for example, the right to specified information, which may thus 
become available to unions for collective bargaining purposes. 53   Koene & Slomp conclude 
that few problems emerge in practice from the overlap between trade union and works 
council activities; indeed, '[m]ore than two thirds of trade union organisers and works 
council chairpersons have no knowledge of such problems'. 54 
To sum up: works councils do not remove the need for shop stewards councils or other 
plant based union structures. On the contrary, it is widely accepted that works councils 
function best if there is an active union structure alongside of them. In practice there may 
be a flexible and informal division of labour between them. In particular, the employer's 
duty to disclose information relating to corporate plans and the state of the enterprise is of 
obvious importance to the development of union policy. The works council's right to be 
consulted over, or to veto, management decisions in respect of certain economic issues can 
reinforce union activity in respect of such issues. Conversely, the union's ability to muster 
action on an industry-wide basis can supplement works councils' weakness in these 
departments. 
Even where unions have failed to build plant level structures, and works councils may 
formally have little connection with the union, there is a tendency for bonds of cooperation 
to develop. Crucial to this are the training and support that unions can offer works councils. 
The difficulty that under-resourced unions in South Africa would have in providing such 
facilities, and possible ways of addressing the problem, have been noted above. 
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12 Collective Bargaining and Consultation - a Case of 'either/Or'? 
Many South African trade unionists argue that the proposed topics of consultation in the 
draft bill form part of the potential barganing agenda and call for a general duty to bargain 
rather than a duty to consult. 55   However, the mere fact that employers are obliged to 
consult over these topics would not prevent a union from bargaining over them where the 
employer is willing to do so or where the union is able to compel bargaining, provided the 
right to strike is not curtailed or excluded in the way that the draft bill proposes. 
Rather, as in Europe, the employer's duty to consult could offer an opportunity for a union 
to gain entry to a workplace and start a de facto relationship with the employer even where 
it has limited support. 56   This raises another question mark, from a union point of view, 
against the wisdom of confining workplace forums to enterprises where the union is already 
strong. 
In the Netherlands, indeed, it has become increasingly normal for unions to delegate to 
works councils, by means of collective (framework) agreements, a de facto capacity to 
bargain with employers over actual conditions of employment at plant level. The draft bill 57   
gives the capacity to employers and representative unions to replace by collective 
agreement the entire scheme of consultation contained in chapter V with their own 
preferred conception of what the powers of a workplace forum ought to be. Such an 
agreement could, for example, stipulate the capacity to bargain over conditions of 
employment. 58 
This need not mean the thin end of the wedge for industry level collective bargaining. The 
most obvious safeguard would be a stipulation (as in Germany and the Netherlands) that 
collective agreements shall prevail over works council agreements. The draft bill, no doubt 
because of its concern to maintain a separation between bargaining and consultation topics, 
does not contemplate the possibility of overlap and contains no similar provision. 
 
 
13 the Problem of Smaller Enterprises 
In South Africa, as in many other countries, smaller enterprises tend to be largely 
unorganized and outside the ambit of collective 
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bargaining. Given the importance attached to collective bargaining by public policy and the 
widespread view that the bulk of job creation in the future will be in small and medium 
enterprises, this should be cause for concern. 
Could the extension of rights of consultation and/or joint decision making to employees in 
smaller enterprises help to address the problem? While consultation and joint decision 
making are not the same as collective bargaining, there are (as was noted above) some 
distinct points of connection between the two processes. Both involve discussion between 
employers and employees on a collective basis over employment related issues. For the 
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employer accustomed to dealing with employees in an autocratic or paternalistic way, as 
well as for workers, crossing one threshold may assist in crossing the other. 
Yet the draft bill, as already noted, only considers unionized workplaces with 100 or more 
employees eligible for workplace forums. From the tone of the Explanatory Memorandum 59   
it is apparent that the absence of workplace forums is seen as a form of assistance to small 
and medium enterprises. The perceived interest of those employers in being relieved of any 
duty to consult, in other words, is treated as paramount. The importance of workplace 
forums, and the aims of public policy and economic restructuring as expounded in the 
Explanatory Memorandum - not to mention the interests of employees - do not seem to 
feature. 
The identity crisis of workplace forums grows more serious: are they, economically 
speaking, a blessing or an affliction? In other countries the duty to establish a works council 
rests on employers with (in the case of Germany) as few as six employees. It is true that in 
Germany, as in other countries, works councils are comparatively rare in smaller 
workplaces. 60   The point is that this has been a result of purely practical causes; it was 
not brought about through a policy of legal exclusion. 
Why does the draft bill set its face against the establishment of works councils in smaller 
enterprises? If cost is the issue, it would be a simple matter to stipulate the kinds of costs 
for which employers will be liable and the circumstances under which they would become 
liable for what. 61   Alternatively (or additionally), provision could be made for forms of 
representation specially adapted to the situation of the smaller enterprise. In very small 
workplaces it is arguable that no special structures of employee representation are needed 
since the parties are in one-to-one 
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contact. Even here, however, the objects of worker participation are no less valid than in 
larger workplaces and, even if no special structures are created, the appropriate rights of 
consultation and/or joint decision making should be vested in the workforce as a whole. 
In the Netherlands, for example, employers with ten to 35 employees - while free to 
establish works councils - are required by law to hold consultative meetings with their 
employees at specified intervals and on specified topics. 62 
The provision in clause 13 of the draft bill for the election of union representatives with 
limited powers, in workplaces with ten or more members of a registered union, will also 
have little impact on smaller workplaces. 
A possibility of opening the door to collective relationships by means of a creative 
adaptation of the participatory mechanism has thus been passed by. 63   It is submitted 
that this issue, in particular (a) the limit of 100 employees and (b) the possibility of special 
structures adapted to the needs of small workplaces, should be revisited. The integration of 
a large and possibly growing number of the most disadvantaged workers into the organized 
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On balance it is debatable whether chapter V of the draft bill succeeds in meeting the aims 
it has set for itself, let alone the wider objectives that the institution of worker participation 
might be expected to serve. 
Some of the problems noted above stem from the attempt to accommodate unions' 
short-term interests. At the same time, limitations are placed on industrial democratization 
in response to employers' concerns. The need to seek the broadest possible support for an 
innovation such as this is unquestionable. Unfortunately, little was done in the period 
leading up to publication of the draft bill to prepare the ground or to educate an employer 
and trade union public with no experience of a system of this nature. Only seven months 
elapsed from the appointment of the drafting team to the publication of the draft bill, for all 
of which time the team's activity was shrouded in confidentiality. The present uncertainty or 
disarray concerning its future should come as no surprise. 64 
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The negative reaction to chapter V thus far underlines the importance, as argued repeatedly 
above, of clarity and consistency when seeking to introduce a piece of social engineering as 
radical as this. Even if not all parties can be convinced, at least those with honest doubts 
will more readily be persuaded to give the new policy a chance if all its parts can be 
explained in terms of its overall objectives, rather than in terms of winning tactical support 
at the expense of overall objectives. If the object of employment democratization is to 
enhance economic efficiency through the optimal involvement of all those forming part of 
the productive process, then this should be the criterion in determining the rights and duties 
of the parties at every stage. 
However, a more fundamental question has been raised by the degree of controversy 
surrounding the draft bill. Worker participation is premised on the ability and willingness of 
employers and workers to adopt a non-adversarial stance in respect of non-wage matters. 
The apparent debacle at NEDLAC and the threat of a general strike over the content of a 
statute intended to herald a new era of greater cooperation between management and 
labour do make it seem doubtful whether labour relations in the new South Africa have 
reached the degree of what some term 'maturity' to sustain a viable system of worker 
participation. Do the parties, in Blanpain's words, want 'to work together' or 'to fight'? 
Certainly, the distance separating employers and workers in political as well as material 
terms is far greater in South Africa than in the countries where works councils are well 
established. Only time will tell how these differences are to be resolved. 
In the meantime economic life must continue, and employers and workers will continue to 
shape and reshape the institutional framework through which their relationship is 
expressed. It is to be hoped that the criticism attracted by the draft bill will result in careful 
revision and produce a statute in line with the developmental aims of public policy. If so, 
employers should indeed be able to reap the benefits of increased productivity and other 
benefits identified in the Explanatory Memorandum. For unions and for the country as a 
whole, the gains could be even more profound. A working population comprising a majority 
of the country's people could be assisted in overcoming the legacy of oppression and 
becoming more active and creative participants in the longer term project of building a new 
South Africa. The impact of worker participation must, of course, not be exaggerated. 
Relations at work are only one part of social life and activity; but a very important part. The 
new labour law offers an opportunity of ensuring that the possibilities of human resource 
development in this area are utilized to the full. 
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